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Abstract
This article analyses the changed structures, actors and modes of communication that characterise ‘dissonant public
spheres.’ With the #120decibel campaign by the German Identitarian Movement in 2018, gender and migration were
pitched in a racist tune, absorbing feminist concerns and positions into neo-nationalistic, misogynist and xenophobic pro-
paganda. The article examines the case of #120decibel as an instance of ‘affective publics’ (Lünenborg, 2019a) where forms
of feminist protest and emancipatory hashtag activism are absorbed by anti-migration campaigners. Employing the infras-
tructure and network logics of social media platforms, the campaign gained public exposure and sought political legitimacy
through strategies of dissonance, in which a racial solidarity against the liberal state order was formed. Parallel structures
of networking and echo-chamber amplification were established, where right-wing media articulate fringe positions in an
attempt to protect the rights of white women to be safe in public spaces. #120decibel is analysed and discussed here as
characteristic of the ambivalent role and dynamics of affective publics in societies challenged by an increasing number of
actors forming an alliance on anti-migration issues based on questionable feminist positions.
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1. Introduction
In the past decades, an increasing mobilisation of right-
wing actors on social media has been observed by fem-
inist scholars and political scientists (Ging & Siapera,
2018; Sauer, 2020; Sorce, 2018). Such actors seek to
delegitimise feminist positions or rewrite them for their
own agitation where women’s rights are turned into
an argument against immigration. Fear of sexual vio-
lence is stirred up to support political demands for
curbing migration flows and enhanced policing of pub-
lic order. Quite often, such demands are voiced by a
younger generation of primarily male lead figures who
seek broader legitimacy for their claims by teaming up
with female figures. But gender is not only instrumen-
talised by the far right in the anti-migration issue, as
Sauer emphasises: “The radical right actively engages
in ongoing gender struggles, in transformations of gen-
der relations, in order to transform liberal democra-
cies and to push towards a new hegemonic project”
(2020, p. 27). Angry dissonance and an offensive stance
towards the liberal state order are characteristic of these
movements and their interventions in feminist struggles.
This article proposes a theoretical and methodological
approach for analysing such affective modes of commu-
nication in ‘dissonant public spheres.’ Based on a case
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study of the #120decibel campaign, which was launched
in January 2018 by the German-Austrian Identitarian
Movement (German: Identitäre Bewegung, also referred
to as Generation Identity; see Richards, 2019), the analy-
sis shows how emotions like fear and anger underwrite
the political thrust of the campaign as a way of govern-
ing people (Sauer & Penz, 2017), relying on demarca-
tions of inclusion and exclusion to produce social posi-
tions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Lünenborg, 2019b). The focus on
the affective dynamics around and within the campaign
further allows us to understand how emotionally expres-
sive interventions by right-wing actors seek to instrumen-
talise feminist positions for propagandistic purposes.
The case of #120decibel serves as a representative
example of strategies that rely on affective dynamics and
the divisive potential of right-wing activism. Presented
as a grassroots campaign of white, Western European
women against the alleged violence of migrant men in
Europe, the campaign poses as an empowerment strat-
egy for women’s rights. However, it openly supports
an anti-migration and racialised discourse on cultural
uniformity and national identity. Geared primarily to
social media, the campaign exploits a “technically and
organisationally mediated ‘unmediatedness”’ as Krämer
has put it (2017, p. 1298). Followers get seemingly
direct access to populist leaders through highly com-
plex infrastructures of mediation and networking. The
empirical data for this article is based on the video of
the #120decibel campaign itself, comments and replies
posted by users under the official campaign video (in
German) on YouTube (n = 1,130, obtained through the
YouTube Comment Scraper on July 4, 2019) and a collec-
tion of all tweets around the campaign containing the
hashtag #120db on Twitter (January to June 2018). The
data from Twitter is especially useful for retracing the
network of actors and the structures of the #120decibel
campaign, whereas the different affectivemodes of com-
munication around the campaign become apparent in
the video itself and the users’ comments. We combine
these data sources to offer a comprehensive analysis of
the affective publics emerging around the campaign.
The first part of our article discusses how populist
actors are increasingly absorbing emancipatory strate-
gies in the name of right-wing agitation. These strategies
are pervaded by affective modes of communication tar-
geting potential followers. They aim to create and spread
dissonance in political debates, confusing (or destabil-
ising) key terms to create legitimacy for actors’ causes.
The second part presents the case study of #120decibel
based on the central analytic categories of actors, struc-
tures and modes of dissonant publics. Here we retrace
the specific dynamics of the circulation of online con-
tent, their main actors and structures, and especially
their affective modes (solidarity among women, polari-
sation, amplification). In the concluding outlook section,
we discuss implications for feminist media studies, high-
lighting long-term effects of such campaigns and the
gradual incorporation into seemingly ‘alternative’ world
views which perpetuate a reactionary philosophy of fem-
inism. We also address the methodological challenges of
analysing the circulation of such content in a highly fluid
online environment.
2. Populist Absorption of Emancipatory Strategies
through Affective Communication
Emancipatory articulations and other inclusive forms
of communication around feminist politics have long
dominated the research agenda in feminist media stud-
ies. Prominent examples of feminist online activism
include #SayHerName, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen
and #GirlsLikeUs (Brown, Ray, Summers, & Fraistat, 2017;
Jackson, Bailey, & Foucault Welles, 2018; Kuo, 2018),
where intersectional inequalities and power hierarchies
within the feminist movement have also been exposed.
In light of #MeToo or its German predecessor #Aufschrei
(#Outcry; Drüeke & Zobl, 2016; Maireder & Schlögl,
2014), social media have facilitated and shaped new
spaces of emancipatory articulation, especially for actors
misrepresented or ignored in journalistic discourse.
These emancipatory potentials, though, are becom-
ing gradually absorbed by populist and right-wing actors
on social media and the web, posing significant chal-
lenges for feminist media studies, both analytically
and methodologically. Emancipatory objectives such as
the protection of women’s rights are put at the ser-
vice of reactionary nationalist propaganda spreading
online. Social media and global networks of circulation
are strategically used to spread misinformation, taking
advantage of social media’s algorithmic logics of popular-
ity to spread content widely (Faris et al., 2017; Guenther,
Ruhrmann, Bischoff, Penzel, & Weber, 2020; Zerback,
Töpfl, & Knöpfle, 2020). Such strategies by alt-right actors
are characterised by the circumvention of institution-
alised actors such as journalists or political parties to cre-
ate publics for their causes. Campaigns are developed
to recruit followers broadly disenfranchised from main-
stream discourses, who are supplied with oppositional
world views, news resources and images. As Krämer
points out: “Wemay witness the development of distinc-
tively right-wing populist elements in the lifestyle of dis-
tinctmilieus (with their own symbols, language, and prac-
tices that transcend the political sphere in the narrow
sense)” (2017, p. 1297). Such strategies are less bound
to right-wing party politics but work laterally to influence
the perception and framing of political issues through
their own host of terminologies, platforms, actors and
cultural tropes. Fielitz and Marcks (2019) argue that this
form of “digital fascism” persists on established “myths
of menace” (p. 2) from outside forces endangering the
cultural integrity of a national (and often racial) com-
munity, seeking to establish “new orders of perception
prone to fascism” (p. 8). One strategy on social media
is to “blur the difference between abstract structures
and concrete events” (p. 10), always taking individual
incidents as representative of a larger systematic failure
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in society and pitching their significance in a constant
climate of fear. In the long run, individual events are
used to perpetuate a gradual change in public discourses
where “the mutual production and amplification of fear
is the central transmission belt between the structural
conditions of social media and the inherent logic of fas-
cism” (p. 19).
Forms of ‘online misogyny’ (Ging & Siapera, 2018),
‘hashjacking’ (Darius & Stephany, 2019; Knüpfer,
Hoffmann, & Voskresenskii, 2020) and racist propa-
ganda in the name of human rights (Richards, 2019;
Schneiker, 2019) are becoming more widespread strate-
gies to directly enlist social media followers for reac-
tionary politics and forge anti-elitist, nationalistic and
radicalised discourses. In the case of #120decibel, a dis-
course on women’s safety in public spaces is constructed
as a threat to the cultural norms of the German nation
(and its population) and the apparent failure of its polit-
ical system to ensure basic human rights. The primary
aim of the campaign simply seems to only call atten-
tion to violence against women by giving voice to them
as potential victims of male, migrant perpetrators. But
by pitching gender in such a racist tune, the campaign
employs a familiar obfuscation strategy of right-wing agi-
tation: Nurturing a populist agenda through a simplistic
notion of women’s emancipation. Speaking in defence
of safety here creates a mandate for militant solidarity
among white women against an ominous threat, a dis-
cursive move that can be considered to have created the
threat in the first place.
Such cases illustrate awider trend towards ‘dissonant
public spheres’ that characteristically exhibit new actors,
structures and modes of communication, especially in
online contexts (Pfetsch, 2018). Arguments and political
positions are bound up in an inextricable mix of informa-
tion, opinions and emotional appeals circulated as affec-
tive communication with often incompatible viewpoints.
As political issues are continuously instrumentalised
in affective publics, it becomes problematic to uphold
a terminology of deliberation and rational discourse to
explain them (Lünenborg, 2020). As Pfetsch, Löblich,
and Eilders argue (2018, p. 482), the co-existence of
many issue publics—their ruptures, contradictions and
contentions—requires an understanding of ‘dissonant
public spheres’ as including both the unrelated juxta-
position of various public contributions from personal,
semi-public and public sources and explicit counter-talk
to a perceived hegemonic perspective articulated in jour-
nalistic media (Lünenborg & Raetzsch, 2018). Dissonant
publics are shaped through affects and are remark-
able for three aspects: New actors emerge as discur-
sive authorities, often employing an anti-institutional
and anti-hegemonic thrust in their communication. The
changed structures of these public spheres often rely
on the specific logics of online platforms and enable
new kinds of transnational networking of actors, uphold-
ing thematic solidarity from issue to issue. Such struc-
tures enable newmodes of expressive affectivity—anger,
shock, solidarity and empathy—whereby new actors are
engaged and can possibly be enlisted in political cam-
paigns. The temporal dynamics of network communi-
cation, linguistic informality (including irony) and direct
feedback contribute to increasing dissonance and reveal
the affective dynamics of online contention (Pfetsch
et al., 2018, p. 485).
The notion of ‘affective publics’ (Lünenborg, 2020;
Papacharissi, 2015) focuses on the specific tone and
modality of communication in digitally networked con-
texts, or what Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2012)
have identified as an “affective news stream” (p. 279).
Although the affective intensity varies greatly, the rela-
tional and processual character of communication in dig-
ital environments evolves constantly in the interaction
betweenmany participants andmedia technologies, cre-
ating what Hillis, Paasonen, and Petit (2015) have called
‘networked affect.’ Affect becomes relevant for feminist
research in networked and mediated communication,
because it offers theoretical perspectives to go beyond
dichotomist distinctions of us and them, brain and body,
human and non-human, men and women (Lünenborg
& Maier, 2018). Affect thus describes this dynamic, rela-
tional occurrence through which actors and objects are
connected to one another. The analysis of affective
dynamics aims at situational and relational events in
their physical/bodily expression among actors. In a crit-
ical perspective, the effects of affect are organising inclu-
sion and exclusion and are thus producing social posi-
tions such as ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Especially in the context of
migration issues, right-wing actors exhibit blunt forms of
racism that allow affective modes of public discourse to
become dominant.
The #120decibel campaign exemplifies this dynamic
of affective publics within a dissonant public sphere.
The video absorbs feminist politics into a reactionary,
propagandist campaign that appropriates concepts such
as gender equality and feminist politics in the name of
agitation and racist fear-mongering. The goal of this arti-
cle is to demonstrate how the specific pitch of this cam-
paign resonates with the structural logics of distribu-
tion and attention in social media, in which conditions
of dissonance and affective communication emerge that
oppose and seek to dismantle deliberative processes.
3. The Case of #120decibel: Absorbing Feminism into
Pitched Online Circulation
The #120decibel campaign was launched January 30,
2018, and was featured on Facebook, Twitter and
YouTube. These social media platformsweremainly used
to distribute a protest video titled German Women Rise
Up! (in German: Frauen wehrt euch!; 120decibel, 2019),
e.g., on the social media accounts of the lead figure
of Generation Identity, Martin Sellner. By invoking hash-
tags against sexual violence, e.g., #MeToo from 2017
or the campaign #Aufschrei (#Outcry) from 2013, the
#120decibel activists present themselves as the “real
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outcry.” The protagonists of this campaign purport to
represent all (white, European) women left unprotected
by a failing, pro-migrant liberal state and mobilise for a
racially segregated affective alliance of women against
an alleged invasion from outside Europe. On the now
defunct website of the campaign, #120decibel was con-
sciously positioned as a German, patriotic response
to #MeToo:
Join in, stand up and let them hear your voice! 120
decibel is the sound volume of a pocket alarm, which
now is carried by many women. 120 decibel is the
name of our movement, which will sound the alarm
and warn against imported violence. Join the move-
ment and use the hashtag #120db to tell us your expe-
rience with violence, alienation, and sexual abuse.
(120decibel, 2019; emphasis added)
In the almost four-minute video German Woman Rise
Up! various young women speak directly into the cam-
era, set in seemingly private surroundings and under-
lined by dramatic music: “My name is Mia. My name
is Maria. My name is Ebba.” They speak on behalf of
European victims of violence committed by refugees.
A threatening scenario is laid out, in which a seemingly
personal experience is used to give the impression that
any and every woman could become the next victim by
suggesting that “they could be me and I could be them.”
The video makes the message tangible: “My name is
Ebba. I was stabbed in Kandel,” citing a widely-known alt-
right symbol of migrant violence against women that has
been instrumentalised since 2017 to form a supposed
women’s alliance against migration. The protagonists of
the video emotionalise and personalise the experience
of threat by migrant perpetrators, stirring up fear and
representing themselves as activists who will counter
this threat and “be loud.” Themessage is clear: “Because
you refuse to secure our borders, because you refuse to
control who is coming in, because you refuse to deport
criminals,” women need to stand up and ensure their
own safety. Drüeke and Klaus (2019, pp. 90–92) have
analysed the content of the campaign and shown how
the video is attributing sexualised violence andmisogyny
to a threatening ‘other.’ This strategy is based on absorb-
ing feminist discourses of self-determination into a sim-
plified solidarity of feminine identities, thereby mark-
ing migration as the core threat to self-determination of
(white, Western European) women. The discursive strat-
egy consciously invokes debates about New Year’s Eve
in Cologne 2015/2016 (Dietze, 2016), where sexual vio-
lence against women was presented and negotiated as a
cultural problem caused by failed integration into main-
stream German society. In response to the racialised
discourse on New Year’s Eve in Cologne and pinpoint-
ing its ‘ethno-sexist’ framing (Dietze, 2016), the hashtag
#ausnahmslos (#noexception) initiated a public debate
on sexualised violence in Germany against all women
while exposing the close connection between racism
and anti-feminism (Hark & Villa, 2020). The #120decibel
video was distributed on different channels, many of
which have been deleted in the meantime. Multiple
channels reached over 100,000 clickswith this video. The
online campaign went hand in hand with direct action
in the streets and public interventions (see Figure 1). On
February 17, 2018, the Frauenmarsch (women’s march)
took place in Berlin. This protest was organised by Leyla
Bilge, a politician of the far-right party Alternative für
Deutschland (Alternative for Germany). Frauenmarsch
called for the “protection of the German woman from
imported violence” (in German: Schutz der deutschen
Frau vor importierter Gewalt). On February 19, 2018,
the #120decibel group disrupted a public #MeToo discus-
sion during the Berlinale film festival with banners, fly-
ers and noise. On March 23, 2018, during the protest
action Dead Girls Don’t Lie (in German: Tote Mädchen
lügen nicht), activists staged themselves as dead women
in blood, memorialising the murder of a 17-year-old girl
in Flensburg.
Interventions and events in public spaces sustain
attention for the campaign and typically coincide with
high circulation of online content and tweets. The data
generated around the hashtag #120db on Twitter shows
a clear hierarchy of a few highly-connected accounts.
These accounts act as nodes to create connections (ties)
by sharing images and links (Himelboim, Smith, Rainie,
Shneiderman, & Espina, 2017, pp. 2, 6), circulating the
hashtag and content from affiliated accounts. The col-
lection of all Twitter activity under the hashtag #120db
between the campaign’s launch on January 30, and its
phasing out towards May 31, 2018, includes 172,972
tweets from 44,834 unique user accounts.
For our analysis of actors, structures and modes of
affective publics, we relied on a smaller sample from the
same dataset, collecting all tweets (n= 24,115) from the
most ‘popular’ nodes (n = 60). We used a basic mea-
sure of indegree to identify the most mentioned and
retweeted users in the network. The outdegree leaders
in this dataset act as diffusers of messages (Tyshchuk,
Li, Ji, & Wallace, 2014, p. 12). While indegree leaders
account for most of the original content being created,
outdegree leaders support the diffusion of messages in
the network, often as bots that artificially ‘game’ themet-
rics of Twitter to create popularity for the campaign.
In the following sections, we will present the cen-
tral findings about actors, structures and modes of the
#120decibel campaign.
3.1. Actors: Few Accounts Drive Circulation
The analysis of Twitter data shows that very few nodes in
the networks of accounts are the main driving forces in
the circulation of #120decibel and the content created
around the campaign. The 30 most prominent in- and
outdegree leaders in the dataset account for most of
the network dynamics and the high visibility of the
hashtag. An indegree leader (AmyMek) reaches a value
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#Metoo intervention at Berlinale
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Campaign video launched on various platforms,
e.g. versions with English subtitles
Volume of tweets over time
Figure 1. Activity on Twitter around the hashtag #120decibel, showing how offline events typically coincide with increased
online activity, following the wide circulation of the hashtag at the start of the campaign on January 30, 2018.
of 11,940, whereas the 30th most prominent account
(Samtpfote29) only reaches a value of 773. The outde-
gree leaders differ in a range from 4,557 (_macmike) to
226 (angelneptustar).
The main content producers of #120decibel are rep-
resented among the 30 indegree leaders as so-called
authorities or “crowdsourced elites” (Papacharissi & de
Fatima Oliveira, 2012, p. 274). These few accounts cre-
ate a lot of content as well as being frequently retweeted
and linked to specific actors. A key figure here is Martin
Sellner. He hosted the campaign website, supported the
distribution of the video on his YouTube channel, and
he is an indegree leader on Twitter. Analysing the other
accounts supports the assumption that Martin Sellner
and Generation Identity in general are central to the
online spread of the campaign (Sorce, 2018). Sellner is
personally connected to many of the content produc-
ers, such as his wife Brittany Pettibone and their friend
Nick Monroe (nickmon1112). Personal accounts of the
German Generation Identity Movement are also among
the indegree leaders as well as GenIdentLondon and
GenIdenEngland. Our analysis shows that all of the iden-
tifiable indegree leaders are representatives of differ-
ent alt-right movements working in concert with the
anti-migration protest. In the run-up to the campaign,
people from Generation Identity were also connected
to the positions of #120decibel, introducing actors such
as Berit Franziska (also known as Annika S.), who ran a
right-wing, anti-feminist blog and appeared in long inter-
views together with Martin Sellner (most videos deleted
now). This kind of ‘authentic’ content by the campaign’s
protagonists is later referenced during the campaign and
strategically positioned to validate their messages and
long-term engagement.
Right-wing media and websites also play a cen-
tral role here. Examples are jouwatch, DefendEvropa
or allegedly crowd-sourced journalistic offers such as
RefugeeCrimeMap. Such sites become discursive author-
ities in the dissonant public sphere of #120decibel by
reporting positively about the campaign or substanti-
ating the #120decibel agenda with additional content.
Right-wing media take over journalistic functions for
their audiences by offering ‘alternative viewpoints’ and
presenting their content in a professional style across
different platforms and outlets. This parallel journalis-
tic coverage sustains and legitimises the alleged protest
movement in approving tones. A few commenters on
YouTube explicitly make argumentative reference to
sources such as politikversagen.net, unzensuriert.de
or journalistenwatch.com, outlets which have a clear
agenda against the political status quo and legacy media.
Numerous specific resources are also mentioned that
purport to map the increased violence against women,
such as rapefugees.net (although the site distances itself
from right-wing propaganda) or ehrenmord.de. While
the scope of actors on YouTube is broader, the use of
established journalistic resources iswidely limited to doc-
umenting and proving the increase of attacks against
women. In a single instance, a user lists 25 links to jour-
nalistic media and alt-right outlets covering alleged rape
cases in his YouTube comment; most other commenters
do not link to anything.
The 30 outdegree leaders in the Twitter dataset
act as diffusers, and are responsible for the reach of
#120decibel. Many accounts are anonymous and have
meanwhile been blocked (as of November 2020). Only
four of the 30 accounts can be identified. Many of the
anonymous ones have conspicuous characteristics, which
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suggests a goal-oriented use of the accounts known from
social bots: Automated follow-back and retweeting arti-
ficially increase the reach of the hashtag within the
network logics of Twitter. With three basic tests, we iden-
tified several accounts as social bots in the group of out-
degree leaders, knowing fully well that a clear reliable
identification method is still not available. Based on pre-
vious studies, however, we classified accounts as social
bots when they a) generate more than 50 tweets on aver-
age per day, b) have a ratio of less than 1.3 between fol-
lowers and follow backs and c) have 3,000 followers or
more (see Keller & Klinger, 2019, p. 177). In our sample,
the outdegree of social bots is about three times higher
than the outdegree of inconspicuous users. Among these
social bots are accounts such as IsidorMeyer1, which pro-
duces 522 tweets on average per day and follows approxi-
mately 7,000 accounts, but is also followed back about as
often. Another account is identified as _macmike, who
is the outdegree leader. This account alone produces
a quarter of all tweets in the sample, posting an aver-
age of 183 tweets per day and following 4,800 other
accounts (as of July 2018). The analysis of the outdegree
leaders shows that they are often metrics-based, auto-
mated accounts which appropriate and ‘game’ the logics
of socialmedia infrastructure (Petre, Duffy,&Hund, 2019)
to imitate mass circulation and thereby sustain the rele-
vance and urgency of the campaign.
3.2. Structures: Using Social Media Infrastructure to
Fake an Outcry
The actors use the infrastructure of social media in order
to create urgency through circulation within very short
time frames. Their use differs decisively from the use
of social media in digital activism through the purpo-
sive employment of automated accounts that dissem-
inate messages, links and hashtags. But the extensive
use of the hashtag does not correlate with the high
number of women actually giving witness, as in #Outcry
or #MeToo. For example, the account gab.ai/myerikd
marks police reports or newspaper articles (mostly from
obscure online sources) with #120decibel, in which the
victim is a woman and the perpetrator seems to be
a migrant. The infrastructure of social media enables
low-cost ‘astroturfing,’ creating with just a few users “an
impression of widespread public concern about an issue
where little or no genuine public concern may exist”
(Harcup, 2014, p. 22). The specific dynamics of online
circulation here suggest a front of solidarity among
women against migrant violence, while actors in this net-
work exploit network structures and their logics deliber-
ately to absorbwomen’s rights into anti-migration propa-
ganda and thereby enlist more followers to their cause.
The #120decibel campaign is staged with human actors,
those acting as indegree leaders and as the ‘faces’ of
the video, while the relevance and urgency of the cause
is sustained by social bots to generate reach. Using
the infrastructure of Twitter and YouTube, a transna-
tional network is formed, linking mainly actors from the
USA, Great Britain, Germany and Austria (see Knüpfer
et al., 2020). This network creates a topic-related soli-
darity against migration under the #120decibel hashtag
and propagates associated events and content created
around it to underline the legitimacy of its cause.
3.3. Modes: From Solidarity to Polarisation—Affective
Intensities
The analysed actors appropriate the infrastructure of
social media platforms in very specific ways to drive
affective flows and user engagement with the contro-
versial topic of the campaign. These modes of affective
communication are most visible in the staging of the
video and the bodily performance of the main actors
in it, the affective flow of responses to the video on
Twitter and YouTube as well as the increasing polarisa-
tion of the debate. These modes can be analysed by a
method that Berg, von Scheve, Ural, and Walter-Jochum
(2019, p. 47) call “reading for affect.” Relying on Reddy
(2001), ‘emotives’ become specific forms of speech acts
that do not simply have emotions as referents, but are
performatives that ‘do things to the world’: “Emotives
are themselves instruments for directly changing, build-
ing, hiding, intensifying emotions” (Reddy, 2001, p. 105).
Affect in language can thus be identified by three ele-
ments: Attribution of emotion words to specific actors,
linguistic collectivisation and themateriality of discourse
itself. Different actors in and around the campaign use
emotives as performative speech acts to create affective
intensities that account for the relevance of the theme
of the campaign. These affective intensities coalesce
around three core themes: solidarity among women,
polarisation and amplification.
3.3.1. Solidarity among Women
The video itself stages a type of witnessing through bod-
ily representation by women: The campaign emulates
strategies of a grassroots movement to give voice to
marginalised actors: “My name is Anna, my name is Mia,
I was stabbed in Kandel, I was raped in Malmö, I was
tortured in Rotherham.” Emulating the voice and pos-
ture of a personal witness, the bodies of these white,
middle-class women demarcate a Western, European
identity and cultural affinity to viewers from similar
backgrounds. Using the performative pattern of femi-
nist protests, the statements here offer a choreogra-
phy of performed accusations. Through the dissonance
between a political outrage and the apparent familiar-
ity of their home surroundings, the women in the video
contrast sharply with the alleged threat of a hostile
world invaded by migrant perpetrators. Their visual pres-
ence introduces them as young white women, made up
with care, and placed in neat middle-class living rooms
that feature candles and bookshelves. The voices of
the actors, the light used and the spatial surroundings
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create a stereotypical female/feminine (not feminist!)
notion of collectivity. The cosy atmosphere produces a
space of belonging for those familiar with such a lifestyle,
offering an imagined community of German/Austrian
‘us’ as opposed to ‘the others/them’ threatening this
very safety. As these women vehemently demand to be
safe, they also urge women to take safety (and pocket
alarms) into their own hands, raising their voices on
a marginalised issue, seemingly in self-defence and in
an attempt to garner support. This affective intensity
and collectivisation is mirrored on YouTube, where com-
ments of approval and admiration for the protagonists’
‘courage’ are overwhelmingly represented.
3.3.2. Polarisation
The strategy of polarisation can be traced throughout the
video and in YouTube comments. For example, there is a
cut in the video at minute 2:20: The music stops, a black
screen separates the introductory ‘testimonial part’ from
a direct acclamatory address of the protagonists to the
viewer: “It can’t go on like this,” says the lead figure in
the video (PaulaWinterfeldt, a protagonist of Generation
Identity Germany), “going jogging at night has become
the most dangerous kind of sport for us,” says another
(Franziska), changing the register to a direct form of
address: “We fight back.” Ariane says: “#120decibel is the
nameof our resistance initiative—bywomen forwomen.”
The affective mode of soft female conviviality is harshly
interrupted. The ‘other,’ the ‘foreign’migrant has invaded
the cosy home and is threatening the community of
white, Western women. Leaving the soft sound of togeth-
erness, the performing women articulate “the real out-
cry,” announcing to bring the perpetrators to justice and
encouraging women “to be loud.” They ask their viewers
to share their experiences “as women” on social media,
using a discursive framing of Entfremdung (alienation,
estrangement), Belästigung (molestation) and Gewalt
(violence). The polarisation spills over into a direct call for
action and the sustained need for collective solidarity of
women: “I want YOU to become active….Become part of
our movement.” With the establishment of a clear divi-
sion between victims and perpetrators, the video legit-
imises self-defence and connects it to a larger opposi-
tion to the political system itself. This polarised climate
is mirrored in a number of comments on YouTube: Either
the German government (as a system of party and busi-
ness interests or simply as “Merkel”) is seen as the rea-
son for failure, attracting perpetrators from “archaic soci-
eties,” or the creators of the video and their followers are
attacked for their divisive politics.
3.3.3. Amplification
The affective intensities around the video tend towards
a greater amplification of polarised viewpoints and opin-
ions. In the majority of comments on YouTube, users
react overtly with positive and supportive responses.
One user writes: “Yes, ‘they’ are lurking everywhere, but
really. Uuuunbeliiiievable [clown smiley]” (anonymised
reference, translation and approximation of typography
in German by authors for this and all following citations).
Here, the materiality of discourse itself produces affec-
tive intensity. Another user voices a more general tone
of comments: “Well done start of the campaign, at the
right time, in the right tone.” Yet another user writes:
“I am so happy that there is now this community.” The
most liked comment here reads: “Thank you for show-
ing face and sticking out your head. Because the great-
est fear is still that someone discovers right[-wing] ideas.
The fear of being raped or stabbed comes later.” But
it also has to be noted that many comments openly
expose the right-wing rhetoric of the video and oppose
the alleged threat: “All this stupid gossip about foreign-
ers. I can’t hear this crap anymore….Nazis should be for-
bidden!” While these opposing perspectives are mostly
isolated, there are also few occasions where patterns of
an exchange between users appear in comments and
replies to each other. Yet, these exchanges are equally
charged with dissonant rhetoric and seemingly incom-
patible political world views. References to legacy media
or alternative, right-wing media are few: Most of the
links to these outlets in the dataset are posted by only
one user in a single, very long comment. The affective
structure of discourse is marked by antagonist positions,
not producing any kind of direct interaction or dialogue.
These confrontational arguments do not aim at delib-
eration, but at the loudest possible dissonance. This
pattern is further amplified by the use of emojis and cap-
italisation of core messages along with repeated excla-
mation marks, openly hostile insults and the use of
derogatory language. These ‘emotives’ (Reddy) perfor-
matively produce affective recharging. The line of con-
frontation runs between the various system critics united
in anti-migration protest and the government which is
perceived as pro-migrant. This ‘illegitimate’ system also
includes institutions that support it, e.g., established
media outlets. Both occasional and intense users of
YouTube and Twitter are implicated in an anti-migrant
“neo-community” that unites around the rejection of lib-
eral state orders and modern individualism, even if their
individual motivations are incompatible. As an ‘affec-
tive community’ (Zink, 2019), the notion of belonging
is established by the revival of essentialism, threatened
cultural traditions and the re-biologisation of political
categories (Koppetsch, 2019, p. 163). Its affective struc-
ture is based on a defence against outsiders and critics
and the amplification within various parallel structures
of communication (e.g., personal messengers, private
social media accounts).
4. Outlook: Implications for Feminist Scholarship with
Digital Methods on Digital Media
With #120decibel we observe a strategic transnational
alliance of anti-migration protesters. They represent
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common fears and offer simple solutions to complex
problems of migration, social justice or cultural identity.
Themovement relies on a few strongly networked actors
to create the sense of a grassroots action from below.
Part of the dissemination strategy is driven through
metric-based actors, increasing reach through retweet-
ing on a massive scale by use of semi-automation. This
form of ‘astroturfing’ imitates an ad hoc public but con-
ceals the purposeful actions geared at ‘gaming the algo-
rithm’ of Twitter or YouTube. Yet, there is a great dif-
ference between waves of solidarity that are technically
initiated and the actual support by only a few actors
when it comes to action on the street or interventions in
offline public fora. By imitating feminist protest practices
as well as hashjacking #MeToo or #Aufschrei (Knüpfer
et al., 2020), attempts are made to overturn and instru-
mentalise feminist debates. This strategic action is not
aimed at deliberation but at creating dissonance and dis-
orientation around the terms being used by actors in pub-
lic debates. Loud and affective dissonance with regard
to the allegedly pro-migrant liberal state order becomes
an end in itself. This dissonance aims at the delegit-
imisation of the existing political system and at the
same time affirms the legitimacy of the ‘neo-community’
of migration critics. Parallel structures fulfil journalis-
tic functions for this community and strengthen actors
by establishing self-referential networks where women’s
rights are instrumentalised against migration. Such a
dissonant, affective formation must be understood as
an elementary strategy of these actors, which endan-
gers the democratic consensus and communicative foun-
dation of society (Schatto-Eckrodt, Boberg, Wintterlin,
Frischlich, & Quandt, 2019).
It is the specific quality of these ‘networked affects’
(Hillis et al., 2015) onwhich extreme right-wing actors are
relying heavily when producing racist and anti-feminist
sentiments. Affective dynamics in social media are char-
acterised by high intensities as an outcome of polarisa-
tion, provocation, irony and personal affection. While
a vast amount of research has looked at the positive
effects of solidarity and empowerment through affec-
tive strategies (Nikunen, 2018; Papacharissi & de Fatima
Oliveira, 2012), our research shows a similar capacity for
exclusionary discourse to delimit forms of national and
cultural belonging. Radical right-wing actors strategically
use a discourse on women’s rights to affectively exclude
migrants from an imagined, biologistic national commu-
nity. By celebrating white women’s bodies and ‘female
conviviality’ in need of defence, an affective community
is produced against the embodied threats of the ‘other.’
What we find is a deliberately agitational campaign for
reactionary politics in the nameofwomen’s safetywhich,
as Krämer points out, requires “an optimum between
vagueness and clarity” (2017, p. 1300) to appeal to many
different users of social media. The subject of violence
against women here merely serves as a highly conflict-
ual perspective on how the state and society are pre-
sented as failing in general, motivating feelings of resis-
tance and making it legitimate to take law into one’s
own hands.
The case study also shows practical research chal-
lenges for gender media studies. The instability and
fluidity of the web make certain research practices diffi-
cult that rely on the stability and findability of sources.
Discourses must be viewed and archived immediately
and on various platforms, since actors often switch
between accounts or are forced to use different plat-
forms due to legal and terms of service violations (e.g.,
hate speech). Research on such fluid networks is further
limited by the long-time span between data collection,
analysis, writing and publishing. A lot of primary mate-
rial may already have become inaccessible to the reader
once an article is published as concerns several sources
used in this article. Standard academic citation practices
here cannot ensure the findability of content as much as
they may contribute inadvertently to a further increase
of attention and circulation of such material. Here, the
characteristics of the web are exploited by right-wing
actors, who change platforms and channels frequently,
mirror content across sites and delete offensive material
after receiving complaints. This quick pace of relocating
content can often be interpreted as a deliberate obfus-
cation strategy. Over time, exposure to such material is
more difficult to retrace from a research interest, but
its long-term effects are a slow incorporation in a right-
wing world view over seemingly inconspicuous and even
positive political causes. The reinterpretation of feminist
politics used in such campaigns underlines that schol-
ars need to pay more attention to the latent, gradual
absorption of key terms into reactionary propaganda. By
employing the advocacy for social causes in the language
of the afflicted, this kind of propaganda consciously
rests on mobilising affective publics through seemingly
bottom-up modes of address that gain public attention
through the inherent logics of social media networks.
Dissonance becomes amode of public communication, is
intensified and made acceptable over time, by rejecting
established modes of deliberation and representation.
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